The chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal has renewed talk about striking out and leaning less on the U.S. But is it possible?
Europeans are a moody lot. Whenever they feel neglected by America â meaning most anytime Washington is busy elsewhere â there is much wailing and gnashing of teeth. And endless demands for âreassurance,â as in additional promises to spend and do even more to defend the continent.
European unease again is on the rise. President Joe Bidenâs chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal allegedly without even the pretense of consultation hit Europe particularly hard. There were charges that Biden didnât coordinate with European governments, which had sizable groups of military personnel and civilians in Afghanistan (The NATO chief denies the alliance wasnât consulted). It would seem that the continental states have more reason than usual to be upset.
While brickbats tossed Washingtonâs way arenât likely to have much effect, Europeâs impotence has spurred renewed interest in expanding the continentâs military capabilities, which could become the most significant consequence of Europeâs involvement in Washingtonâs 20-year Afghan misadventure.
When European defense ministers gathered in late August, their meeting was filled with complaints of a âfiascoâ and âdebacle.â They were frustrated that they had no ability to act independently but had to rely on America. Of course, none of this should have been a surprise. French President Emmanuel Macron previously called NATO âbrain dead,â promoted âstrategic autonomy,â and advocated a âtrue European army,â with no result. Grandiose ideas of an independent European military force have long circulated to no end. More than two decades ago plans were actually made for a 60,000 multinational force, which never appeared. Nor did later proposals for 1500-member âbattle groups.â
Now Josep Borrell, the European Unionâs de facto foreign minister, wants to establish an âinitial entry forceâ of about 5,000 soldiers. He complained: âWe Europeans found ourselves â not only for the evacuations out of the Kabul airport but also more broadly â depending on American decisions.â The Afghanistan experience was particularly painful, he observed, showing âthat the deficiencies in our strategic autonomy come with a price.â He advocated ânew tools like this entry force,â so âThe only way forward is to combine our forces and strengthen our capacity and our will to act.â
With an equivalent combined economy and larger population than America, Europe has long had the resources necessary to create such a unit. However, the will was always lacking, even for what would be small ball for America. Has that finally changed?
Significant barriers to action remain. Historically, Washington opposed such an independent European force. U.S. officials feared that separate units would cause penurious Europeans to reduce resources available to NATO. Moreover, past administrations worried that the continent would move toward a more independent foreign and military policy, which is anathema to Washington. The U.S. wants Europe to do more, but only under the formerâs control.
Nor has the continent shown any interest in doing more. Despite modest growth in military outlays by a number of European states since 2014, the continent continues to badly lag Americaâs effort. In a pitifully honest self-review, German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer admitted that âWithout Americaâs nuclear and conventional capabilities, Germany and Europe cannot protect themselves.â She cited estimates that âthe United States currently provides 75 percent of all NATO capabilities.â
Only France and the United Kingdom possess capable armed forces of serious size. Germany, Italy, and Spain have sizeable economies but minimal militaries, in theoretical and practical strength. Indeed, the poor readiness of the Bundeswehr, the heir to the once mighty Wehrmacht, would be comical if not so serious. Even countries which claim to fear Russian revanchism, most notably the three Baltic states and Poland, spend little more than 2 percent of GDP, a miserly investment on behalf of their freedom. In the field, noted Rem Korteweg of the Dutch Clingendael Institute, Bosnia and Libya demonstrated âthe inability of Europeans to do anything serious without the Americans.â
Although most European leaders formally assent to NATO insistence that they spend more, there is no public support for doing so. Most Europeans do not fear Russia, the only plausible security threat. Those who do expect Washington to shield them. That is why the eastern-most members of NATO want the presence of an American military tripwire, to ensure U.S. deaths (not theirs) and trigger automatic American involvement in war on their behalf if attacked by Moscow. Fear of U.S. disengagement might cause more European countries to spend more on their militaries, but so far no one expects the American military to go home. As long as Washingtonâs security guarantee appears secure, few European nations are likely to make an added investment in a European âinitial entry force.â
Indeed, Europeans do not support going to war for their neighbors even while expecting Americans to go to war for them. Last year the Pew Research Center surveyed 14 NATO members. In Poland, which constantly demands more U.S. attention, only 40 percent of respondents agreed that âour country should use military forceâ in response to a Russian attack on a NATO ally. Just a third in Germany, which was loaded with allied troops during the Cold War. And a quarter in Greece and Italy. Although many governments are more supportive of NATO and military outlays than their publics, at a time of economic difficulty and fiscal stringency they are more likely to curb than expand spending on the armed forces.
President Biden should strongly support European efforts to create more effective militaries, however they are organized. Indeed, he should go further and encourage the continent to move toward military independence.
Although advocates of staying in Afghanistan forever pointed to U.S. deployments in Europe and Asia as precedent, foreign policy scholar Mark Sheetz noted that âthe purpose of Americaâs âtemporaryâ intervention in Western Europe was to eliminate the need for âpermanentâ intervention.â Similarly, Dwight Eisenhower, NATO supreme commander before becoming president, warned against acting like âa modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions.â Instead, he advocated helping âthese people [to] regain their confidence and get on their own military feet.â
Of course, establishing a 5,000-member rapid deployment force would be only a small start to Europeans getting âon their own military feet.â The Center for American Progress recently reported: âEuropean militaries have now experienced decades of decline. Today, much of Europeâs military hardware is in a shocking state of disrepair. ⊠European forces arenât ready to fight with the equipment they have, and the equipment they have isnât good enough.â
However, the crushing embarrassment of Afghanistan might help change that. Paolo Gentiloni, EU commissioner and former Italian prime minister, allowed that âItâs a terrible paradox, but this debacle could be the start of Europeâs moment.â Although only if Europe chooses to spend and do more.
History is not promising, but reality might finally intrude. The Europeans lack credibility in criticizing Washingtonâs admittedly wretched performance in Afghanistan. Their insults will merely antagonize Americans tired of European cheap-riding. And defense subsidies for Europe will inevitably be targeted as Washingtonâs debt explodes, heading toward the post-World War II record and ultimately well beyond.
The Afghanistan imbroglio provided Europe with a long overdue wake up call. The Biden administration should reinforce that message by warning that the U.S. will not forever provide defense welfare for a continent both prosperous and populous. If European governments donât like being treated dismissively by Washington, they need the capability and will to act independently.