Nongqai BLOG By Dr. Willem Steenkamp
ABSTRACT: Intel Analysis security situation round SA Elections – An intelligence analysis of the national security situation likely to pertain just prior to, and especially in the aftermath of the 2024 South African general elections, shows a high probability that unrest will occur. Without wishing to be alarmist and knowing that South Africans have been capable of achieving miracles (at least in the eyes of foreign observers – such as during the 1994 transition to a non-racial democracy), there remains a possibility that a new government will again be quickly established with no instability of note. However, this time round the probability that high levels of unrest will occur in at least some areas of the country, is assessed as significant. Things are, however, in a state of flux and it is not possible to specify here exactly where disturbances are likely to occur (except in general terms), what their severity will be in each locality, and how long such instability will persist. What cannot be ruled out, though, is that the levels and duration of such violence, as well as the footprint, may significantly exceed that witnessed in July 2021. (This assessment is based on open sources and analytical logic, not on hard tactical intelligence of a secret nature, so that greater specificity is not currently possible – however, for planning purposes it is essential to now already take cognisance of the perceived probability of violent unrest, if only on the basis of “better safe than sorry”; all will rejoice if this assessment proves wrong and everything in fact passes tranquilly).
PLAN AHEAD FOR PROBABLE UNREST DURING AND ESPECIALLY AFTER THE 2024 S.A. GENERAL ELECTION
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Ever since the 1950s organised Black politics in South Africa (just as in much of Africa) has been marked by a division between moderate elements who would prefer to adhere to non-racial, Western-style policies, and those who strive for a so-called Africanist approach. Within the ANC this gave rise to the Africanist PAC element splitting off in the late 50s (also because of their resistance to the influence of non-Black communists within the ANC/SACP alliance). In the seventies the Black Consciousness Movement came to the fore.
Within the ANC/SACP alliance itself, the “Lusaka” and “London” wings were clearly discernible, with the latter (personified by eventual president Thabo Mbeki) representing the moderate tendency. The fact that President Nelson Mandela had embraced the moderate approach in the late eighties as a matter of realpolitik (without disavowing the Africanist or communist wings) ensured that the ANC moderates were in control during the transition negotiations (which meant that they no longer insisted upon the notion of a Marxist people’s republic and adopted a Western-style constitutional democracy).
This did NOT mean, however, that the Africanist wing had abandoned their dreams of a National Democratic Revolution (NDR). Tactically, they had merely recognised as priority the need to first get rid of the white government, with the NDR to follow at an opportune future moment.
The ascendancy of the moderates came to a fall at the ANC’s Polokwane elective conference in December 2007. The “Lusaka” wing’s master tactician, Mac Maharaj (who my father, the late general Frans Steenkamp, former head of the SA Police Security Branch had always described as the most dangerous ANC leader) and sworn enemy of Thabo Mbeki had identified the flaw in the ANC’s internal constitution that would allow his man, Jacob Zuma, to be elected as party leader. What was needed was to flood the conference with delegates from KwaZulu-Natal (from a multitude of new branches which had legitimately been registered there).
Since the South African constitution is structured in such a way that the dominant faction within the dominant party (if it holds a majority of the seats in parliament) effectively appoints the head of state, Zuma was duly inaugurated as the country’s president.
During his presidency Zuma already gave clear signs of his Africanist convictions, although he then made no attempt to amend the existing Western-style constitution.
In fact, it was Zuma who expelled from the ANC the radical young Turks who would then form the EFF (Economic Freedom Fighters) under the leadership of Mr Julius Malema.
Zuma soon enough found himself surrounded by “advisors” bent on milking the state coffers. This negatively affected the popularity of the ANC. Together with the fear among other ANC members that Zuma was also giving Zulus disproportionate power within the ANC, and with backing from white business, the “moderate” wing mounted a comeback, forcing Zuma’s resignation and the election as party president of Cyril Ramaphosa in December 2017.
Zuma has been defending himself ever since against legal accusations of corruption. His brief incarceration in 2021 for contempt of the Constitutional Court led to an outburst of violent protest and looting, principally in his home province of KZN. He was rapidly made part of a general sentence remission and released.
WHAT THE JULY 2021 UNREST DEMONSTRATED
The July 2021 unrest underscored three crucial points, each very relevant to this analysis:
- Firstly that, as tool for exerting political pressure, instigating such violent unrest UNDOUBTEDLY WORKED;
- Secondly, the security forces were totally INCAPABLE OF MANAGING THE SECURITY SITUATION; and
- Thirdly, for the instigators there HAS BEEN NO CONSEQUENCES.
That said, by the end of 2023 it had become increasingly clear that Zuma’s “Stalingrad” stalling tactics in court had effectively reached the end of the road. This time, Team Zuma analysed the national constitution. Based on proportional representation and thus systemically favouring the creation of a multitude of small parties, the opportunity was there for Zuma to once again become a member of parliament.
FORCING A COALITION GOVERNMENT BY WEAKENING THE ANC
More importantly, though – if the ANC could be brought to below 50% of the seats in parliament by siphoning off a chunk of their traditional voters with Zuma’s new MK party, then the ANC would be forced to seek coalition partners and the tail may end up wagging the dog. (The fact that the MK name and logo were chosen, makes it clear that the principal objective is to siphon off ANC voters to this “purified” or “original” party harking back to the liberation movement days; the part’s manifesto with its Africanist and NDR objectives also makes this clear).
The importance of all of the foregoing when one assesses the probability of violence prior, during and especially after the elections, is that the peaceful nature of the elections held from 1994 till 2019, were in most part due to the fact that it had always been a foregone conclusion that the ANC would win an absolute majority. Now, however, there is for the first time the probability (according to the opinion polls) of the ANC not achieving an outright majority. This means that the election as such, will be no more than the initial scene-setter this time round.
It is not the 2024 election that will determine the composition of South Africa’s next government (if, as predicted, no party wins an absolute majority). It will be those politicians newly elected to parliament, through horse-trading among themselves. Trying to form a stable coalition…
READ FULL ARTICLE HERE… (nongqai.org)
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